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RESUMEN
Murdoch trata del concepto de virtud en diversos textos en los que aparece estrecha-
mente relacionado con otros conceptos que son esenciales para entender su explicación de 
la teoría ética. Definida como “atención desinteresada a la naturaleza”, la virtud establece 
la conexión entre los seres humanos y la realidad y puede entenderse en términos de cono-
cimiento y de imaginación; en consecuencia, Murdoch afirma que la virtud mantiene una 
clara relación con las novelas. La finalidad de este artículo es analizar los textos de Iris 
Murdoch sobre la virtud para explicar sistemáticamente las características de la virtud, su 
conexión con otros conceptos y su importancia en el mundo del arte.
ABSTRACT
 I. Murdoch deals with the concept of virtue in several texts in which it  appears 
closely related to other concepts which are essential in order to understand her explana-
tion of ethical theory. Defined as “selfless attention to nature” virtue makes a connection 
between human beings and reality and it can be understood in terms of knowledge and 
imagination and a result of this Murdoch says that virtue has a clear relationship with 
novels. The aim of the paper is to analyze Iris Murdoch’s  texts about virtue in order  to 
systematically explain the characteristics of virtue, its link with other concepts and its 
great  significance in the world of art.
The philosophical thought of Iris Murdoch proposes that no ethical 
tradition has ever adequately fashioned a picture of human beings as they 
truly are, and in the course of her career this was what she used her writing 
in philosophy and literature to illustrate: a personal vision of man’s morality. 
If we consider ethicists’ preoccupations in recent history, we might argue that 
these have mainly been the examination of moral being to justify why humans 
choose what they choose in particular circumstances, rather than the develop-
ment of any concept of a ‘moral character’ that might constitute the essential 
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source of all the moral choices ordinary human beings make. If we acknowl-
edge that such a character does indeed exist, then it will naturally follow that 
we as humans have an important inner life characterised by a certain degree 
of essential unity. In the end, what is certain is that our ‘moral character’ 
becomes apparent in the moment we act, and is itself the result of something 
that began long ago. And for Murdoch, this was the importance of virtue. 
Virtue is a result and because she understood that this result may hide the great 
effort and determination that went into producing it, she would most probably 
have agreed with Aristotle’s proposal that ‘the life that conforms with virtue 
is thought to be a happy life; but virtuous life involves serious purpose, and 
does not consist in amusement.’ (Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 9, 1177a2-3). In 
this paper, therefore, I shall attempt to examine Iris Murdoch’s understanding 
of such a life, and of the concepts involved in its development.
In The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited, Murdoch analyses the defi-
nitions of virtue proposed by Kant and Hegel, and by the schools of existen-
tialism and empiricism, which she considers as one. She observes that Kant 
equates virtue with freedom and reason in such a way that he sees virtue as 
our ability to impose rational order and so ties it to the rational, even though 
such virtue may not constitute a manner of concrete knowledge. Hegel, she 
argues, would also consider virtue as a manner of knowledge but would define 
it more exactly as freedom understood as self-knowledge. Finally, in contrast 
to the Kantian and Hegelian traditions, empiricism and existentialism have 
interpreted virtue more properly in terms of will and choice than knowledge. 
Murdoch may also allow that virtue should relate to knowledge, but she quali-
fies her definition in more precise terms that challenge the positions of Kant 
and Hegel: virtue is concerned with the ability to respond and to act, but is 
tempered by the knowledge it supposes. In The Sovereignty of the Good, she 
has this to say:
“Of course virtue is good habit and dutiful action. But the background 
condition of such habit and such action, in human beings, is a just mode of 
vision and a good quality of consciousness. It is a task to come to see the 
world as it is.”1
Murdoch is more interested in understanding what prompts virtue – what 
it needs to come into being – than in examining how a given act might derive 
from a particular virtue. She has less time for that notion of ‘habit’ in the 
1. The Sovereignty of Good, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, p. 91. The emphasis 
is Murdoch’s.
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sense of ‘habitus’ that has been considered so important by such thinkers 
as Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, or by their commentators (such as modern 
ethicist Philippa Foot, who, incidentally, declared the reading of Aquinas to 
be imperative for any understanding of true virtue). For this reason, the con-
ditioning factors in the analysis of virtue often provide Murdoch with a means 
of defining virtue itself. So, for example, an accurate perception of what sur-
rounds me is a necessary condition for virtue, but so is the manner in which I 
actively go about defining it: in Murdoch’s own words, “virtue is the attempt 
to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is”.2 
Where one of human nature’s principle attributes is this ‘selfish con-
sciousness’, then virtue can be regarded as the highest expression of an indi-
vidual’s ability to relinquish the ego and learn to look at reality as it is. The 
prerequisites for virtue are, as Murdoch says ‘a just mode of vision and a good 
quality of consciousness’. These are what afford us an accurate knowledge of 
the world as it stands, and acquiring such knowledge requires an effort from 
the individual to transcend the self and come closer to all that lies beyond 
it.  Murdoch attributes what she calls ‘clear vision’ to moral imagination and 
moral effort. In fact, what a person perceives determines their moral faith 
because we choose from what we are able to see (SG, p. 59), and what we 
know determines how we act. Each of us moves between the self and the real-
ity we must strive to know, between our attempt to open the doors to the outer 
world and the failure to do so. And in this movement, the deadliest enemy of 
morality or virtue is the ego. This is why, Murdoch says, personal fantasy car-
ries us still further away from moral excellence because it swaddles the self 
with desires and reveries that impair our perception of the outer world (SG, p. 
59). In this sense, she pits the reality of the private and subjective individual 
against the outer reality of other individuals and all things. 
But what can help us open that door when all human determination lies 
buried in the ego? What makes a man transcend himself and become receptive 
to outer reality? What can lead an artist to overcome ‘selfish consciousness’ 
and express what is beyond? In Murdoch’s writing, we find characters who 
occasionally manage this. So with Bradley Pearson in ‘The Black Prince’, 
we see the experience of true love guiding one individual’s steps towards the 
discovery of another, and so it appears that true love can transform because 
it frees the individual from those damaging bonds of the self and brings us 
closer to the form of the Good. 
2. Ibid., p. 93.
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Naturally, however, not all forms of love are equally desirable: in 
her essay The Fire and the Sun, Murdoch distinguishes between love that 
respects, which attempts simply to approach the object of its attention on 
that object’s own terms, and grasping love that would possess and absorb. In 
the light of this distinction, we might wonder on the nature of self-love. In 
Murdoch’s view, might it be possible for any form of self-love not to be self-
ish and, therefore, to be moral? Aristotle has already established distinctions 
between the moral and selfish variants of self-love. Does Murdoch’s writing 
propose that there are objective methods to perceive something as subjective 
as personal reality? Or can there be no objective knowledge of the self? To my 
mind, at least, there are as yet no clear answers to either of these questions. 
Self-deception protects pride, Murdoch observes, and as the muddy reflection 
of humility, pride loudly declares its inability to muster interest in anything or 
anyone beyond the limits of what it can gain. The question is whether the self 
can exercise some manner of protection from its own deception so that that 
the humble man can be considered to have knowledge of his own being, to 
have foregone his ego and to have opened the gates to an outer reality that he 
will be able to fully embrace. I do not know if Murdoch would have believed, 
like the German philosopher Robert Spaemann, that love for others can pro-
vide the path towards moral self-love inasmuch as it benefits the loving being 
almost as much as it favours him. 
And yet it is not only love that can redirect our attention from the self 
towards other beings, but beauty, too. Beauty is one of the qualities that most 
successfully bring human beings out of themselves: its presence in Art and 
in Nature invites selfless, non-possessive contemplation, and it provides us 
with one of our greatest opportunities to renounce selfish consciousness (SG, 
p. 84). Art, Murdoch observes, is the sanctuary of beauty (Metaphysics as a 
Guide to Morals, p. 122). Art has a liberating effect upon the self, freeing it 
of its own consciousness and guiding it towards beauty, and beauty in turn 
thus becomes the path towards the Good. Both the artist and the virtuous 
being share the ability to appreciate the greater reality beyond their person, 
but although their predisposition towards reality is one and the same, in the 
artist’s case the arrival at this reality is offered to others and therefore becomes 
an element of moral education. In order for the artist to stand before reality 
and be able to depict it objectively, his being must be cleansed of all those 
forms of interference originating in the nature of the self. A pure state of mind 
is one which has been stripped of vested interests and transcends the selfish 
consciousness that distracts us from the contemplation of another being and 
that hampers our ability to perceive its essence. The moral agent, as the artist, 
must indeed ‘pierce the veil’ which the self hangs between it and reality. The 
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virtuous man and the good artist are able to transcend their egoism. Art helps 
the individual to move beyond what is ‘apparent’ and express truth, where 
‘apparent’ means the multitude of devices the self designs for solace and to 
shield it from confrontation with the fundamental questions of life and death. 
In this sense, the role of Art consists in revealing to us suffering, pain, and 
truth, and Art is the goddess in Parmenides’ ‘Way of Truth’, who guides the 
soul towards alethea and away from the treacherous path of doxa.
The cornerstone of Murdoch’s theory on the power of Art to stimulate 
morality is this: good Art serves man by freeing him from his selfish con-
sciousness. This is why we read in her treatise Acastos that Art is education and 
that as a fundamental method of explanation, good Art makes good citizens.
In this reality that good Art can lead us to, we find other important fig-
ures: the term which is used to describe the relationship that one human being 
has with others is attention. Attention is the eye’s steady, just and loving gaze 
as it regards individual reality; indeed, it is the understanding that others exist. 
Murdoch proposes that attention is the essential feature of the active moral 
agent (SG, p. 34), and that love, a central concept in the question of morality, 
is the knowledge of the individual (SG, p. 28). 
To ‘attend’ is to ‘look’ and not simply to ‘see’. The gaze is cast upon the 
individual and observes the individual’s particularity. With attention, a person 
offers their interest and dedication, and accompanies this offering by the act 
of discarding the self. The perfect model of such attention is offered by the 
man who is humble, in the sense that “because he sees himself as nothing, 
[he] can see other things as they are” (SG, p. 103-104). However, as Patricia 
J. O’Connor has observed, this attention must respect the other and must not 
attempt to turn that other into part of its own reality; for this reason, attention 
must be accompanied by some degree of detachment, meaning that it has to be 
managed by a love that respects rather than a love that seeks to possess.3
Vision leads to choice and choice to act. Nothing stands between choice 
and act, and the latter depends entirely upon vision: “[…] true vision occa-
sions right conduct” (SG, p. 66). Choice and act are consistent with vision, and 
distinct visions lead to correspondingly different acts. Here, as elsewhere in 
Murdoch’s writing, we find Plato. The difference of conduct can be reduced 
to a difference in knowledge, and ‘true vision’ cannot lead to conduct that is 
not also true or right.
3. To Love the Good, New York, Peter Lang Verlagsgruppe, 1996, p. 103.
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For Murdoch, reality and the no-self condition human choice and impose 
themselves upon man because in the choices he makes he cannot create his 
own values. Man is not the measure of all things and cannot create values 
because he lives under the yoke of a superior law (Acastos, p. 119), and indeed, 
as Murdoch observes in her writing, no ordinary person would imagine that 
by exercising their power to choose they were actually creating values. Virtue 
has to do with reality, truth and knowledge. He who would perceive the truth 
needs special skill to do so and must also have first suppressed his selfish 
consciousness. What is transcendent is the form of the Good, not the will, and 
in the hierarchy of virtue, neither will nor freedom come first; both freedom 
and the just acts that spring from will are the fruit of attention to the Good that 
holds such an attraction and exercises such power over our acts.
Alongside the concepts of vision, love, truth and beauty, however, read-
ers of Iris Murdoch’s philosophy must also negotiate the fundamental ques-
tion of contingency. The absence of meaning, the slippery nature of those 
terms at our disposal to define our lives and the impossibility of finding sure, 
experiential footholds there are all highlighted in many of her novels. Beyond 
the initially inspiring and positive proposal that our love for others can endow 
our lives with a fullness of meaning, we must eventually reach a darker, more 
sceptical terrain, an area of anthropological, existential pessimism, and read-
ers only have to consider some of the reflections voiced, for example, by such 
characters as Leonard or Julius in ‘An Early Honourable Defeat’.
To this point, the substance of my presentation has considered Murdoch’s 
attempt to explain virtue in rational terms that tie it to a knowledge originating 
in a selfless vision of reality, but many of her texts appear to accept the notion 
that the process by which an individual is transformed into a virtuous being 
remains a mystery of sorts, a fundamental change that defies understanding. 
The presence of goodness in our acts has to do with an act of illumination that 
takes place in a moment we cannot determine or design. The nature of Iris 
Murdoch’s philosophical thought is original and never systematically slavish, 
but in it we see the traces of traditions in moral philosophy from all ages: the 
anthropological pessimism of existentialism, Wittgenstein’s ineffable moral-
ity, Scheler’s intuitive values, the relation between virtue and altruism as 
studied by the Scottish Sentimentalists or Christianity’s legacy of faith.
“How can we make ourselves better? This is a question moral philoso-
phers should attempt to answer” (SG, p. 78). In whatever moments Murdoch’s 
philosophical thought seeks to defend the role of Great Art as an agent of 
education and enlightenment, perhaps that is when the writer most closely 
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approaches an answer. It is true that for a single instant the beautiful plumage 
of that bird in flight can capture our attention and make us forget the self we 
carry with us, but how can we turn the brilliance of an instant into a method 
of moral education? And if, as Scheler observed, we can only appreciate 
the beauty of Nature or Art if we have already developed a disciplined state 
of mind to prepare for the event, then how can we hope to make ourselves 
sensitive to beauty? Perhaps, as Iris Murdoch might describe it, morality can 
only be understood as a revelation which, in our natural and ceaseless state of 
selfish consciousness, we human beings intuit in its passing; a transcendental 
vision that for one moment we have had the good fortune to witness.
